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Abstract—The next-generation energy network, the so-called
smart grid (SG), promises a tremendous increase in efficiency,
safety and flexibility of managing the electricity grid as compared
to the legacy energy network. This is needed today more than
ever, as the global energy consumption is growing at an unprece-
dented rate, and renewable energy sources have to be seamlessly
integrated into the grid to assure a sustainable human devel-
opment. Smart meters (SMs) are among the crucial enablers of
the SG concept; they supply accurate high-frequency information
about users’ household energy consumption to a utility provider,
which is essential for time of use pricing, rapid fault detection, en-
ergy theft prevention, while also providing consumers with more
flexibility and control over their consumption. However, highly
accurate and granular SM data also poses a threat to consumer
privacy as non-intrusive load monitoring techniques enable a
malicious attacker to infer many details of a user’s private life.
This article focuses on privacy-enhancing energy management
techniques that provide accurate energy consumption informa-
tion to the grid operator, without sacrificing consumer privacy.
In particular, we focus on techniques that shape and modify the
actual user energy consumption by means of physical resources,
such as rechargeable batteries, renewable energy sources or
demand shaping. A rigorous mathematical analysis of privacy
is presented under various physical constraints on the available
physical resources. Finally, open questions and challenges that
need to be addressed to pave the way to the effective protection
of users’ privacy in future SGs are presented.
SMART METERS FOR A SMART GRID
The current energy grid is one of the engineering marvels
of the 20th century. However, it has become inadequate to
satisfy the steadily growing global electricity demand. In fact,
the world energy consumption is predicted to increase 48%
from 2012 to 2040 [1], driven by factors such as the growth
of world’s economy, the rise of the gross domestic product
per person, the increase of world’s population, an increased
penetration of electric vehicles, and a broader mobility rev-
olution [2]. Other issues that need to be addressed are the
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TABLE I
LIST OF FREQUENTLY USED ACRONYMS IN THE PAPER.
DSO Distribution system operator
EMP Energy management policy
EMU Energy management unit
MDP Markov decision process
MI Mutual information
NILM Non-intrusive load monitoring
RB Rechargeable battery
RES Renewable energy source
SG Smart grid
SM Smart meter
SMDM Smart meter data manipulation
SoC State of charge
ToU Time of use
TTP Trusted third party
UDS User demand shaping
UP Utility provider
effective integration of renewable energy sources (RESs) and
storage capabilities into the grid, the improvement of the grid’s
environmental sustainability, and the promotion of plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles. To address these challenges, a new
generation of electricity grid is being engineered, the so-called
smart grid (SG). SGs are intended to substantially improve
energy generation, transmission, distribution, consumption and
security, providing improved reliability and quality of the
electricity supply, quicker detection of energy outages and
theft, better matching of energy supply with demand, and
a better environmental sustainability by enabling an easier
integration of distributed generation and storage capabilities.
The “smartness” of a SG resides in the advanced metering in-
frastructure, which enables two-way communication between
the utility and its customers, and whose pivotal element in the
distribution network is the smart meter (SM), the device that
monitors a user’s electricity consumption in almost real-time.
In contrast to legacy grids, in which billing data is gathered
at the end of a billing period, SMs send electricity consump-
tion measurements automatically and at a much higher reso-
lution. SMs enable two-way communication with the utility
provider (UP), the entity that sells energy to the customers,
transmitting a great amount of detailed information. SMs
collect and send bidirectional readings of active, reactive and
apparent power and energy, i.e., the so-called 4-quadrant me-
tering, that is purchased from the grid, or sold to the grid, if the
user produces energy, for example by means of a photovoltaic
TABLE II
TIME RESOLUTIONS OF CURRENTLY USED SMS.
Smart Meter Model Time Resolution
Itron Centron1 1 min
REX22 5 min
Kamstrup Omnipower3 5 min
Enel Open Meter4 15 min
panel. In the latter case, the user is referred to as a “prosumer”,
i.e., a producer and consumer of electricity at the same time,
and can be financially rewarded for the energy sold to the grid.
SMs also keep track of historical consumption data over the
previous days, weeks and months, and provide high-resolution
consumption data analytics to the customers to enable them to
monitor their energy consumption via an in-home display, web
portal or smartphone application, in near real-time. SMs also
send alerts about voltage quality measurements, helping UPs
fulfill their obligations towards customers concerning energy,
power and voltage quality, e.g., in accordance with the Eu-
ropean standard EN 50160. Examples of these measurements
include the root mean square voltage variations, e.g., voltage
dropout, sags and swells, and the total harmonic distortion.
Data used for billing, such as current time of use (ToU) tariff,
balance and debts, credit and prepayment modes, credit alerts
and topping up, is also sent to the UP. SMs can detect if a
tampering takes place, and send relevant data about it, along
with security credentials for enabling the correct functioning
of cryptographic protocols, e.g., hashing, digital signature, and
cyclic redundancy check. Finally, SM firmware information
and updates are also communicated.
The increased data resolution is crucial for enabling SG
functionalities. Table II shows the smallest time resolution
of some SMs currently in use, which is on the order of few
minutes. The European Union recommends a time resolution
of at least 15 minutes to allow the new SG functionalities
[3]. For example, the current SM specifications in the UK
impose that an SM should send integrated energy readings
every 30 minutes to the UP, while the data sent to a user’s in-
home display can have a resolution of up to 10 seconds [4]. It
should be noted that, with the increased adoption of renewable
energy generation by the prosumers, the increased penetration
of electric vehicles and energy storage technologies, and the
diversification of the energy market, it is expected that the SGs
will become more volatile, requiring meter readings at a much
higher rate in the near future.
SMs provide a wide range of benefits to all the parties
in an SG. Thanks to SMs, UPs can gain a better knowl-
edge of their customers’ needs, while reducing the cost of
1https://www.itron.com/na/technology/product-services-catalog/products/0/
7/5/centron
2https://www.elstersolutions.com/en/product-details-na/826/en/REX2
meter
3https://www.kamstrup.com/en-us/products-and-solutions/smart-
grid/electricity-meters
4https://www.enel.com/content/dam/enel-com/pressrelease/porting
pressrelease/1666038-1 PDF-1.pdf
meter readings. SMs allow UPs to determine the electricity
cost dynamically, as well as to produce more accurate bills,
thus reducing customers’ complaints and back-office rebilling.
The implementation of ToU pricing can incentivize demand
response and control customer behavior, while improved de-
mand forecasts and load-shaping techniques can reduce peak
electricity demands. Finally, energy theft can be detected more
easily and quickly.
Distribution system operators (DSOs), i.e., the entities that
operate the grid, benefit from SMs as well, being able to
better monitor and manage the grid. SMs allow DSOs to
reduce operational costs and energy losses, and improve grid
efficiency and system design, as well as distributed system
state estimation and Volt and Var control. Moreover, DSOs
are able to better match distributed resources with the ongoing
electricity demand and the grid’s power delivery capability,
thus reducing the need to build new power plants.
Consumers themselves take advantage of SMs to monitor
their consumption in near real-time, leading to better con-
sumption awareness and energy usage management. Moreover,
consumers receive accurate and timely billing services, with no
more estimated bills, and benefit from ToU pricing, by shifting
non urgent loads to off-peak price periods. Microgeneration
and energy storage devices can be integrated more easily,
and profits from selling the generated excess energy can be
collected automatically. Failing or inefficient home appliances,
unexpected activity or inactivity, and wasted energy are de-
tected faster and more accurately, and switching between UPs
is easier by requesting on-demand readings, which in turn
increases the competition among UPs and reduces costs for
consumers.
For the above reasons, the installation of SMs is proceeding
rapidly, and is attracting massive investments globally. The SM
market is expected to grow from an estimated $12.79 billion
in 2017 to $19.98 billion by 2022, registering a compound
annual growth rate of 9.34% [5]. Moreover, the global SM data
analytics market, which includes demand response analytics
and grid optimization tools, is expected to reach $4.6 billion
by 2022 [6], while the global penetration of SMs is expected
to climb from approximately 30% at the end of 2016 to 53%
by the end of 2025 [7]. These figures show how timely and
crucial the research in this field is, and highlight the need
to quickly resolve potential obstructions that can threaten the
future benefits from this critical technology.
Smart Meter Privacy Risks
The SM’s ability to monitor a user’s electricity consump-
tion in almost real-time entails serious implications about
consumer privacy. In fact, by employing non-intrusive load
monitoring (NILM) techniques, it is possible to identify the
power signatures of specific appliances from the aggregated
household SM measurements. NILM techniques date back to
the work of George Hart in the 80s, who first proposed a
prototype of a NILM device [9]. Since then, NILM techniques
have improved in different directions, e.g., by assuming either
high or low-frequency measurements, by considering known
Fig. 1. An example of a household electricity consumption profile with some
appliances highlighted (data retrieved from the Dataport database [8]).
or learned signatures [10], or even by using off-the-shelf sta-
tistical methods without any a-priori knowledge of household
activities [11]. An example of a typical power consumption
profile along with some detected appliances is illustrated in
Fig. 1. As shown in Fig. 2, the UP, a third party that has
access to SM data, for example, by buying it from the UP,
or a malicious eavesdropper, may gain insights into users’
activities and behaviors, and determine, for example, a user’s
presence at home, her religious beliefs, disabilities, illnesses,
and even the TV channel she is watching [12]–[14]. Apart
from residential users, SM privacy is particularly critical for
businesses, e.g., factories and data centers, as their power
consumption profile may reveal sensitive information about
the state of their businesses to their competitors. SM privacy
has attracted significant public attention, and continues to
be a topic of heated public and political debate, and even
stopped the mandatory SM roll-out plan in the Netherlands
in 2009, after a court decided that the forced installation of
SMs would violate consumers’ right to privacy, and would
be in breach of the European Convention of Human Rights
[15]. Indeed, concerns about consumer privacy threaten the
widespread adoption of SMs and can be a major roadblock
for this multi-billion dollar industry.
It is worth pointing out that the privacy problem in SMs
is different from the SM data security problem [16]. In the
latter there is a sharp distinction between legitimate users
and malicious attackers, whereas in the privacy problem in
the SM context, any legitimate receiver of data can also be
considered malicious. To benefit from the advantages provided
by the SG, users need to share some information about their
electricity consumption with the UP and DSO. However, by
sharing accurate and high-frequency information about their
energy consumption, consumers also expose their private lives
and behaviors to the UP, which is a fully legitimate user and
a potential malicious attacker at the same time. This renders
traditional encryption techniques for data privacy ineffective in
achieving privacy against the UP, and calls for novel privacy
measures and privacy protection techniques.
UP
Third
 Part
y
Fig. 2. Some of the questions an attacker may be able to answer by having
access to SM data.
PRIVACY-ENABLING TECHNIQUES FOR SMS
There is a growing literature on privacy-preserving methods
for SMs, which can be classified into two main families. The
first family, which we call the SM data manipulation (SMDM)
approach, consists of techniques that process the SM data
before reporting it to the UP, while the techniques in the
second family, called user demand shaping (UDS), aim at
modifying the user’s actual energy consumption. Considered
within the first family are methods such as data obfuscation,
data aggregation, data anonymization, and down-sampling.
Data obfuscation, i.e., the perturbation of metering data by
adding noise, is a classical privacy protection method, and
has been adapted to SGs in [17] and [18]. In [19], differential
privacy, a well-established concept in the data mining liter-
ature, is applied to SMs where noise is added not only to
the user’s energy consumption, via the RB, but also to the
energy used for charging the RB itself to provide differential
privacy guarantees. Along these lines, the authors in [20]
introduce an information-theoretic framework to study the
trade-off between the privacy obtained by altering the SM
data and the utility of data for various SG functionalities.
Note that, the more noise added to the data, the higher the
privacy, but the less relevant and less useful the data is
for monitoring and controlling the grid. In [20] an additive
distortion measure is considered to model the utility, which
allows the characterization of the optimal privacy-vs-utility
trade-off in an information-theoretic single-letter form. The
data aggregation approach, proposed in [18], [21] and [22],
considers sending the aggregate power measurements for a
group of households so that the UP is prevented from distin-
guishing individual consumption patterns. The aggregation can
be performed with or without the help of a trusted third party
(TTP). The data anonymization approach, on the other hand,
mainly considers utilizing pseudonyms rather than the real
identities of consumers [23], [24]. Another method proposed
in [25], reduces the SMs sampling rate to a level that does not
pose any privacy threat. However, the SMDM family suffers
Fig. 3. Overview of the privacy-enabling approaches for SMs.
from the following shortcomings:
• Adding noise to the SM readings causes a mismatch
between the reported values and the real energy con-
sumption, which prevents DSOs and UPs from accurately
monitoring the grid state, rapidly reacting to outages,
energy theft or other problems, and producing accurate
and timely billing services. These would significantly
limit the benefits of SMs;
• DSOs, UPs, or more generally any eavesdropper can
embed additional sensors right outside a household or a
business (street level measurements are already available
to the DSOs and UPs) to monitor the energy consumption,
without fully relying on SM readings;
• The anonymization and aggregation techniques that in-
clude the presence of a TTP only shift the problem of
trust from one entity (UP) to another (TTP).
These issues are avoided by the approaches in the UDS
family, which directly modify the actual energy consump-
tion profile of the user, called the user load, rather than
modifying the data sent to the UP. In this family, the SM
reports accurately the energy taken from the grid without any
modification; however, this is not the energy that is actually
consumed by the appliances. This is achieved by filtering
the user’s actual electricity consumption via a rechargeable
energy storage device, i.e., a rechargeable battery (RB), or by
exploiting an RES, which can be used to partially hide the
consumer’s energy consumption. Examples of RESs include
solar panels or micro wind farms. Another technique is to
partially shift user’s demand. If we denote the energy received
from the grid as grid load, the idea is to physically differentiate
the grid load from the user load. Note that the effect of
using an RB or an RES can also be considered as adding
noise to the household consumption, but the noise in this case
corresponds to a physical variation in the energy received from
the grid. Moreover, differently from approaches in the SMDM
family, the SM measurements provided by the UDS methods
are exact and there is no issue of data mismatch between the
SM data and the effective user demand from the grid. Thus,
when UDS methods are deployed, the utility of SMs for the
SG is not diminished since the users’ energy consumption
is neither misreported nor distorted. As a result, while the
privacy-vs-utility trade-off is of particular concern for the
SMDM techniques, with the UDS techniques smart grid utility
is never diminished and other trade-offs are considered instead,
TABLE III
SPECIFICATIONS OF SOME CURRENTLY AVAILABLE RESIDENTIAL
BATTERIES.
Household RB Capacity (kWh)
RB Charging
Peak Power (kW)
RB Discharging
Peak Power (kW)
Sunverge SIS-68485 7.7, 11.6, 15.5, 19.4 6.4 6
SonnenBatterie eco6 4− 16 3− 8 3− 8
Tesla Powerwall 27 13.5 5 5
LG RESU 48V8 2.9, 5.9, 8.8 3, 4.2, 5 3, 4.2, 5
Panasonic Battery
System LJ-SK56A9
5.3 2 2
Powervault
G200-LI-2/4/6KWH10
2, 4, 6 0.8, 1.2 0.7, 1.4
Orison Panel11 2.2 1.8 1.8
Simpliphi PHI 3.4-48V12 3.4 1.5 1.5
such as the privacy-vs-cost, or the privacy-vs-wasted energy.
Fig. 3 shows an overview of the privacy-enabling approaches.
The focus of this article is on UDS techniques, which have
been receiving growing attention from the research community
in the recent years. The physical resources these techniques
rely on, such as RBs or RESs at consumer premises, are
already becoming increasingly available, thanks to government
incentives and decreasing cost of solar panels and household
RBs, as well as the RBs for electric vehicles. Moreover,
shaping and filtering users’ actual energy consumption by
means of physical resources renders any data misreporting
or distortion unnecessary, which, thus, do not undermine the
utility of the SG concept itself. We will present a signal
processing perspective on SM privacy by treating the user load
as a stochastic time series, which can be filtered and distorted
by using an RB, an RES and/or demand shaping/scheduling.
The available energy generated by the RES can also be
modeled as a random sequence, whose statistics depend on the
energy source (e.g., solar, wind) and the specifications of the
renewable energy generator. Additionally, the finite-capacity
battery imposes instantaneous limitations on the available
energy. We also note that such physical resources can also
be used for cost minimization purposes by the users, e.g.,
by acquiring and storing energy over low-cost periods, and
utilizing the stored energy in the RB and the energy generated
by an RES over peak-cost periods. Accordingly, we also study
the trade-off between privacy and cost, and the minimization
of the wasted renewable energy. In the following, we describe
and summarize the progress made in recent years towards
quantifying the privacy leakage of SMs in a rigorous manner,
report the most significant results, and highlight a number of
future research directions.
Current Household Batteries, Typical Energy Demands and
Renewable Energy Generation
5http://www.sunverge.com/energy-management/
6https://sonnen-batterie.com/en-us/sonnenbatterie
7https://www.tesla.com/powerwall
8http://www.lgchem.com/global/ess/ess/product-detail-PDEC0001
9http://www.panasonic.com/au/consumer/energy-solutions/residential-
storage-battery-system/lj-sk56a.html
10http://www.powervault.co.uk/technical/technical-specifications/
11http://orison.energy/
12http://simpliphipower.com/product/phi3-4-smart-tech-battery/
TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD POWER CONSUMPTION (RESOLUTION REFERS TO THE MEASUREMENT FREQUENCY). VALUES IN EACH
COLUMN INDICATE THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME THE AVERAGE CONSUMPTION FALLS INTO THE CORRESPONDING INTERVAL.
Source Location Resolution Time Frame # of Houses [0,0.5] kW (0.5,1] kW (1,2] kW (2,3] kW (3, 4] kW (4,+∞) kW
Dataport [8] Texas 60 mins
01/01/2016 - 31/05/2016 512 38 30 20 7 3 2
01/01/2015 - 31/12/2015 703 36 26 20 9 5 4
01/01/2014 - 31/12/2014 720 39 25 20 8 4 4
01/01/2013 - 31/12/2013 419 35 25 21 9 5 5
01/01/2012 - 31/12/2012 182 31 26 24 10 5 5
Intertek [26] UK 2 mins 01/05/2010 - 31/07/2011 251 18 24 47 11 0 0
Dred [27] Netherlands 1 sec 05/07/2015 - 05/12/2015 1 98 1.8 0.4 0 0 0
Uci [28] France 1 min 16/12/2006 - 26/11/2010 1 47 9 28 8 4 2
TABLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE POWER GENERATED BY RESIDENTIAL PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEMS. VALUES IN EACH COLUMN INDICATE THE PERCENTAGE OF
TIME THE AVERAGE GENERATION FALLS INTO THE CORRESPONDING INTERVAL.
Source Location Resolution Time Frame # of Houses 0 kW (0, 0.5] kW (0.5,1] kW (1, 2] kW (2,3] kW (3,4] kW (4,+∞) kW
Dataport [8] Texas 60 min 01/01/2012 - 31/05/2016 351 49 17 7 9 7 6 5
Microgen [29] UK 30 min 01/01/2015 - 31/12/2015 100 51.7 36.4 9.8 2 0.1 0 0
TABLE VI
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE SOLAR PANELS STUDIED IN THE MICROGEN [29] DATABASE. VALUES IN EACH COLUMN INDICATE THE PERCENTAGE OF SOLAR
PANELS THAT SATISFY THE CORRESPONDING PROPERTY.
Solar Panel Area (m2) Solar Panel Cell Type Nominal Installed Capacity (kWp)
(0, 15] (15, 20] (20, 25] (25, 30] (30,+∞) Monocrystalline Polycrystalline (0, 2] (2, 3] (3, 4] (4,+∞)
5 35 44 15 1 93 7 4 36 59 1
Table III lists the storage capacity and peak power of some
of the currently available RBs for residential use. As it can
be seen, the capacities are in the range of few kWhs. For
example, the peak power that batteries with 4 kWh capacity
can output sustainably is on the order of 1−2 kW. However, as
the typical electricity consumption is very spiky (see Fig. 1 for
an example), current batteries cannot fully hide the spikes in
the consumption, due to the charging/discharging peak power
constraints. For example, while a 4 kWh battery can hide a
constant consumption of 2 kW over 2 hours, it cannot fully
hide spikes in the user load of more than 2 kW. An example
of this effect can be noticed in the simulation of Fig. 6.
The typical household average power consumption also lies
within the range of few kWs, as shown in Table IV, where the
distribution of the average user power consumption values over
different years obtained from various databases is reported
with various time resolutions. Analyzing the Dataport database
[8] we observe that, independently of the period considered,
the average user energy demand is less than 2 kWh for
80−90% of the time. Current batteries charged at full capacity
would then be able to satisfy the demand continuously only for
a few hours. However, completely covering the consumption
over a few hours may come at the expense of revealing the
energy consumption fully at future time periods. In fact, once
the RB is discharged, it needs to be charged again before
being able to hide the user consumption; hence, the use of the
RB introduces memory into the system, as decisions taken at a
certain time have an impact on the privacy performance at later
times. We should also remark that the residential electricity
consumption is forecast to increase significantly in the coming
years13, emphasizing the need to intelligently exploit limited
capacity storage devices to hide energy consumption behavior.
We also would like to emphasize that the privacy leakage
is caused mostly by these spikes, which are typically more
informative (e.g., oven, microwave, heater) compared to more
regular consumption (e.g., fridge). Moreover, due to electricity
price variations users may prefer charging/discharging the
battery in certain time periods, which limits the available
energy that can be used for privacy. Finally, it is expected
that the increasingly wider adoption of electrical vehicles and
the mass production and adoption of energy-hungry “smart
devices” will inevitably increase the typical household elec-
tricity consumption, limiting further the rechargeable batteries’
capability in fully hiding the user load.
Table V shows the average power generated via a solar
panel, which is the most common residential RES. Locations,
technology, as well as the inclination and size of the solar
panel affect the generated power, as shown in Table VI for
one of the databases considered, where kWp denotes the
kilowatt peak, i.e., the output power achieved by a panel
under full solar radiation. As expected, around 50% of the
time, i.e., at night, no energy is generated at all, while there
are differences in the distribution of the average values for
the two databases considered, due to the different locations.
Comparing these values with those in Table III, we note that
the battery capacities are large enough to store many hours of
average solar energy generated by the solar panels most of the
time.
Fig. 4. System model. Xt, Yt, Et and Bt denote the consumer’s power
demand, i.e., the user load, the SM readings, i.e., the grid load, the power
produced by the RES, and the battery state of charge at time t, respectively.
The dashed line represents the meter readings being reported to the UP.
A SIGNAL-PROCESSING PERSPECTIVE ON SM PRIVACY
The generic discrete-time SM system model is depicted in
Fig. 4. In this model, each time slot is normalized to unit time;
therefore, power and energy values within a time slot are used
interchangeably. Xt ∈ X denotes the total power demanded
by the appliances in the household in time slot t, i.e., the user
load, where X denotes the user load alphabet, i.e., the set of
values that Xt can assume. The sequence {Xt} denotes the
user’s private information, which needs to be protected. Yt ∈ Y
is the power received from the grid in time slot t, i.e., the grid
load, which is measured and reported to the UP by the SM,
while Y denotes the grid load alphabet. We assume that the
user and grid load powers remain constant within a time slot.
This can be considered as a discrete-time linear approximation
to a continuous load profile in practice. This approximation
can be made as accurate as desired by reducing the time slot
duration.
In current systems, where no energy manipulation is em-
ployed, Yt = Xt, ∀t; that is, the actual energy consumption
of the appliances is reported to the UP by the SM. Instead,
we will assume that an RB and an RES are available to the
user to physically distort the energy consumption; so that what
the user receives from the grid, Yt, does not reveal too much
information about the energy used by the appliances, Xt. We
remark here that the time slots in our model correspond to
time instants when the electricity is actually requested by the
user and drawn from the grid, rather than the typically longer
sampling interval used for sending SM measurements to the
UP. In fact, we assume that the SM measures and records the
output power values at each time slot; this is because our aim
is to protect consumers’ privacy not only from the UP, but
13https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/total-electricity-
consumption-outlook-from-iea/total-electricity-consumption-outlook-from-1
also from the DSO or any other attacker that may deploy a
sensor on the consumer’s power line, recording the electricity
consumption in almost real-time. The state of charge (SoC)
of the RB, i.e., the amount of energy stored in the RB, at
time t, is Bt ∈ [0, Bmax], where Bmax denotes the maximum
battery capacity.Xt−Yt denotes the power taken from the RB,
and the battery charging and discharging processes are often
constrained by the so-called charging and discharging power
constraints Pˆc and Pˆd, respectively, i.e., −Pˆc ≤ Xt−Yt ≤ Pˆd,
∀t. There is typically a constraint on the average energy
that can be retrieved from an RB as well, imposed by an
average power constraint P¯ , i.e., E
[
1
n
∑n
t=1(Xt − Yt)
]
≤ P¯ .
Losses in the battery charging and discharging processes may
also be taken into account to model a more realistic energy
management system. The renewable energy generated at time
t by the RES is denoted by Et ∈ E , where E = [0, Emax].
RBs and RESs are expensive facilities, and installation and
operation costs can be reduced if they are shared by multiple
users, e.g., users within the same neighborhood or block of
flats. Moreover, sharing these resources allows the centralized
management of the energy system, which also leads to a more
efficient use of the available resources. The renewable energy
can be stored in the RB, or used immediately, so that a user
can:
• increase privacy, by avoiding to report her actual power
consumption to the UP;
• decrease electricity costs, by purchasing and storing
electricity from the grid when it is cheaper, and use it
to satisfy future demand, or even sell it back to the UP
when the price increases;
• increase energy efficiency, by reducing the waste of
generated renewable energy when it is not needed, and
when it is not profitable to sell it to the UP.
The random processes X and E are often modeled as Markov
processes, or as sequences of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. Although the UP typi-
cally does not know the instantaneous realizations of these
processes, it may well know their statistics. In some cases, the
UP may know the realizations of the renewable energy process
E, for example, if it has access to additional information from
sensors deployed near the household that measure different
parameters, e.g., the solar or the wind power intensity, and
if it knows the specifications of the user’s renewable energy
generator, e.g., model and size of the solar panel.
Given the above definitions, the battery SoC update can be
expressed as
Bt+1 = min
{
Bt + Et − (Xt − Yt), Bmax
}
. (1)
Sometimes, the user load does not need to be satisfied
immediately in its entirety. In fact, the user load can be further
classified into demand that must be met immediately, e.g.,
lighting or cooking, and demand that can be satisfied at a
later time, the so-called elastic demand, e.g., electric vehicle
charging, dishwasher or clothes washer-dryer. For the latter
demand, the user’s only concern is that a certain task needs to
be finished by a certain deadline, e.g., her electric car must be
fully charged by 8 a.m., and it is not of interest at what exact
time the consumption takes place. This flexibility allows the
consumer to employ demand response to increase her privacy
as well as to lower the energy cost.
The electricity unit cost at time t, denoted by Ct, can be
modeled as a random variable, or in accordance with a specific
ToU tariff. The cost incurred by a user to purchase Yt units
of power over a time interval of τt at the price of Ct is thus
given by τtYtCt. When the presence of an RES is considered,
the prosumer may be able to sell part of the energy generated
to the grid to further improve her privacy and to minimize
the energy cost. If this occurs, the net metering approach
is typically considered, i.e., the utilities purchase consumer-
generated electricity at the current retail electricity rate. The
battery wear and tear due to charging and discharging the RB
can also be taken into account and modeled as an additional
cost [30].
The Energy Management Policy (EMP)
The energy management unit (EMU) is the intelligence
of the system, located at the user’s premises, where the
SM privacy-preservation and cost-optimization algorithms are
physically implemented. The EMP, implemented by the EMU,
determines at any time t the amount of energy that should be
drawn from the grid and the RB, given the previous values of
the user load Xt, renewable energy Et, battery SoC Bt, and
grid load Y t−1, i.e.,
ft : X
t × Et × Bt × Yt−1 → Y, ∀t, (2)
where f ∈ F , and F denotes the set of feasible policies, i.e.,
policies that produce grid load values that satisfy the RB and
RES constraints at any time, as well as the battery update
equation in (1). The optimal policy is chosen to minimize the
long-term information leakage about a consumer’s electricity
consumption, possibly along with other criteria, such as the
minimization of electricity cost or wasted energy. The EMP
prevents outages, and typically it is not allowed to draw more
energy from the grid to be wasted simply for the sake of
increased privacy.
The policy ft in (2) corresponds to an online energy
management policy, i.e., a policy in which the action taken
by the EMU at any time slot depends only on the information
available causally right up to that time. Alternatively, in an
offline optimization framework, the policy takes actions based
also on future information about the system state, i.e., user
load and RES energy generation, in a non-causal fashion.
In the SM privacy literature, both offline and online SM
privacy-preserving algorithms have been considered. Online
algorithms are more realistic and relevant for real-world ap-
plications; however, offline algorithms may lead to interesting
intuitions or bounds on the performance. Moreover, non-
causal knowledge of the electricity price process is a realistic
assumption in today’s energy networks; and even the non-
causal knowledge of power consumption may be valid for
certain appliances, such as refrigerators, boilers, heating and
electric vehicles, whose energy consumption can be accurately
predicted over certain finite time frames.
In the following, we will first present an overview of some
heuristic solutions to the SM privacy problem. Next, we will
describe the more rigorous and mathematically involved tech-
niques, which are aimed at finding the relevant fundamental
bounds and trade-offs.
A HEURISTIC PRIVACY MEASURE: VARIATIONS IN THE
GRID LOAD PROFILE
As in many other problems involving privacy, a wide
consensus over the best privacy measure for SMs has not
been reached yet, and a number of privacy measures have
been proposed in the literature, each with its own benefits
and limitations. Although it is clear that privacy is achieved
when the UP cannot infer a user’s behavior on the basis of
SM measurements, it is challenging to define a corresponding
mathematical measure that is independent of the particular
detection technique employed by the attacker.
Grid Load Variance as a Privacy Measure
One can argue that privacy in SMs can be ensured by
opportunely charging and discharging the RB so that the
grid load is always constant. In fact, the differences in
consecutive load measurements, yt − yt−1, are indicative of
the appliances’ switch-on/off events, the so-called features,
and are typically exploited by the existing NILM algorithms.
Ideally, a completely “flat” grid load profile would not reveal
any feature, and would only leak a user’s long term average
power consumption. However, this would require a very large
battery capacity and/or a powerful RES. Alternatively, the level
of privacy can be measured by the “distance” of the grid
load from a completely flat target load profile, based on the
intuition that the smaller the distance, the higher the level of
privacy achieved [31]. Accordingly, privacy can be defined as
the grid load variance around a prefixed target load profileW ,
i.e.,
Vn ,
1
n
n∑
t=1
E
[
(Yt −W )
2
]
, (3)
where the expectation is over Xt and Yt, and W = E[X ]
typically.
Another important concern for consumers is their energy
cost. With the integration of unreliable RESs into the grid, it
is expected that the unit cost of energy from different UPs will
fluctuate in time. RBs for residential use provide flexibility
to the consumers as they can buy and store energy during
low-cost periods to be used during peak-price periods. The
impact of RBs in reducing the cost of energy to the consumers
have been extensively studied in the literature [32]. Note,
however, that the operation of the EMU in order to minimize
the energy cost does not necessarily align with the goal of
minimizing privacy leakage. Therefore, it is essential to jointly
optimize the electricity cost and the user privacy. If the cost of
Fig. 5. Example of the user load, grid load, and constant target load profiles,
where the “distance” Yt − Wt is highlighted. The aim of the algorithms
presented in this section is to minimize the average squared distance.
energy and battery wear and tear are considered, the overall
optimization problem becomes:
min
1
n
n∑
t=1
E
[
CtYt + 1B(t)CB + α(Yt −W )
2
]
, (4)
where 1B(t) = 1 if the battery is charging/discharging at time
t, and 0 otherwise; CB is the battery operating cost due to the
battery wear and tear caused by charging and discharging the
RB; and α strikes the trade-off between privacy and cost. The
expectation in (4) is over the probability distributions of all
the involved random variables, i.e., Xt, Yt, and Ct.
If Wt = E[X ], ∀t, the EMU tries to achieve a flat grid
load profile around the average user energy consumption with
as little deviations as possible. This scenario is illustrated
in Fig. 5, where the straight blue line is the fixed target
consumption profileWt, and the red line indicates the achieved
grid load profile Yt. For i.i.d. X and C processes, an online
EMP can be obtained using Lyapunov optimization [30]. The
online control algorithm can be formulated as a Lyapunov
function with a perturbed weight and the drift-plus-penalty
framework is adopted, which is typically used for stabilizing
a queuing network, by minimizing the so-called drift, while
minimizing at the same time a penalty function. Here, the
penalty is represented by the optimization target, while the
Lyapunov drift is defined as the difference of the SoC of the
RB at successive time instants. Authors in [30] show that this
approach leads to a mixed-integer nonlinear program, which
they solve by decomposing it into multiple cases, and by
finding a closed-form solution to each of them.
This problem can also be studied in an offline framework,
by assuming the future user demand profile can be accurately
estimated for a certain time horizon, and the energy cost is
known in advance. When privacy and cost of energy are jointly
optimized over a certain time horizon, one can characterize the
points on the Pareto boundary of the convex region formed by
Fig. 6. Examples of user load, grid load, and target load over the course
of a day when a piecewise target profile is considered. The price periods
are highlighted by arrows of different colors. Note that the target assumes a
different constant value for each price period.
Fig. 7. ToU tariff and timing convention used for a piecewise target profile
[33]. t
c
(i) , for i = 1, . . . ,M , are the time instants at which the price of
energy changes, and t
c(0)
= 0.
all the cost and privacy leakage pairs, by solving the following
convex optimization problem [31]:
min
Yt≥0
n∑
t=1
[
(1− α)YtCt + α(Yt −W )
2
]
. (5)
It is shown in [31] that the optimal offline solution has a water-
filling interpretation. However, differently from the classical
water-filling algorithm, which appears as the solution of the
power allocation problem across parallel Gaussian channels
under a total power constraint, here the water level is not
constant, and changes across time because of the instantaneous
power constraints.
A completely flat consumption profile may not be feasible,
or even desirable, for example if the cost varies greatly during
the system operation due to ToU tariffs. Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that a user requests more energy during off-peak
price periods as compared to peak price periods; and hence,
allows a piecewise constant target load [33]. An example of
the application of this strategy is shown in Fig. 6, applied to
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Fig. 8. Privacy-vs-cost trade-off when using a Powervault G200-LI-4KWH
battery for the strategies in [31] and [33].
real power consumption data from the UK-Dale dataset [34].
The optimization problem (5) becomes
min
Yt,W (i)
1
N
M∑
i=1
[ t
c(i)∑
t=t
c(i−1)
(1−α)YtC
(i)+α(Yt−W
(i))2
]
, (6)
where C(i) and W (i) are the cost of the energy purchased
from the UP and the target profile during the i-th price period,
respectively, where 1 ≤ i ≤M ,M is the total number of price
periods during time T , and the i-th price period spans from
time slot tc(i−1) to tc(i) . Fig. 7 depicts the timing convention
considered in this scenario. Energy can be sold to the UP
to further improve the privacy-vs-cost trade-off, as assumed
in [33]. Considering a piecewise target profile improves the
overall privacy-vs-cost trade-off compared to a constant target
profile, as shown in Fig. 8 for a Powervault G200-LI-4KWH
RB when using power consumption data from [34].
A possible extension of the latter work is considering the
multi-user scenario, where, in principle, each user can fix its
own target profile. As long as the target profile does not
depend on the user’s energy consumption profile, the UP
does not receive much information about user’s activities.
On the other hand, the UP can implicitly incentivize users
to choose different target profiles by setting different ToU
prices for different consumers. Since consumers will tend to
buy more energy when it is cheaper, each of the users in the
neighborhood will shift her load to a different time slot, also
balancing the total load on the grid.
Markov Decision Process (MDP) Formulation
In the online optimization framework, where the user load
and the energy generated by the RES can be modeled as
Markov processes (or, as an i.i.d. sequence as a special case),
the SM privacy problem can be cast as an MDP. An MDP
is a discrete-time state-transition system, which is formally
characterized by a state space, an action space, which includes
the possible actions that can be taken by the decision maker
at each state, the transition probabilities from the current state
to the next state, which describe the dynamics of the system,
and the reward (or, inversely, the cost) process, which indicates
the reward received (or, cost incurred) by the decision maker
by taking a particular action in a particular state. The goal
of an MDP is to find the optimal policy that minimizes the
average (or, discounted) cost either by a specified time in the
future, i.e., by considering the so-called finite horizon setting,
or over an indefinite time period, by considering the so-called
infinite horizon setting. To solve the corresponding MDP the
optimal Bellman optimality equations should be formulated
[35], which can be solved to obtain the optimal policy at
each state and time instant. The problem can be solved
numerically for the finite horizon setting, while the value
iteration algorithm can be employed to obtain the optimal
stationary policy in the infinite horizon scenario.
In the SM problem, the state at any time t is typically
represented by a combination of the current battery SoC
Bt, user demand Xt, and renewable energy Et; the action,
performed by the EMU, is represented by the current grid load
and the energy used from the RB and the RES. State transitions
are modelled by the battery update equation, which is typically
assumed to be deterministic, as well as transitions in the user
demand and renewable generation states, which typically do
not depend on user’s actions. The cost function is the privacy
loss that is experienced when moving from one SoC to another
by following a certain action. However, to consider the privacy
as the cost function in an MDP, it is necessary to formulate
the privacy leakage in an additive form across time, so that
the total loss of privacy over multiple time slots is given by
the summation of the privacy leakage at different time slots.
This may be challenging depending on the privacy measure
employed. For example, measuring privacy via the squared
distance of the grid load from a constant target profile has a
straightforward additive formulation, while the same does not
hold when privacy is measured by the mutual information (MI)
between the user and grid load sequences. This is because the
MI takes into account the dependence between the realization
of the user load at time t, Xt, and the current, past and future
realizations of Y , Y1, . . . , Yt, . . ..
When the state and action spaces are continuous, it is
necessary to discretize them to solve the problem numerically.
The accuracy of the numerical solution can be improved
by decreasing the discretization step size, at the expense
of significantly higher computational complexity. When the
dimensions of the state and action spaces render numerical
evaluation of the optimal policy unfeasible, one can resort to
suboptimal solutions that are easier to optimize and compute
numerically, yet may provide near optimal performance or
interesting intuitions. Also, when the information theoretic
privacy measures are used, it may be possible to simplify the
infinite-horizon optimization problem, and write it in a single-
letter form. We will provide further insights into this below.
The SM problem is cast as an MDP in [36], where the loss
of privacy is measured by the fluctuations of the grid load
around a constant target load, and the joint optimization of
privacy and cost is studied. The optimal privacy-preserving
policies are characterized by minimizing the expected total
cost. Denote by ut the action at time t. To solve the MDP the
transition probabilities p(Xt|Xt−1) and p(Bt|Bt−1, ut) need
to be known; however, this is normally not the case, as the
user load and the energy storage usage are typically non-
stationary. Authors in [36] overcome this issue by adopting
the Q-learning algorithm [37], which is an iterative algorithm
used for characterizing the expected cost for each state-action
pair by alternating exploitation and exploration phases. The
corresponding offline optimization policy is also characterized
in [36] to be considered as a benchmark for the online
algorithm. The authors characterize the privacy-cost trade-off
curves, and also evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithm by means of the empirical mutual information.
Temporal and Spatial Similarities in the Grid Load as a
Privacy Measure
Variations in the grid load profile can be captured by con-
sidering power traces of single appliances and by computing
differences in power consumption both in the time domain, i.e.,
consumption deviation over time of a specific appliance, and
in the “space” domain, i.e., consumption profiles of different
appliances. As these variations are computed over a certain
time horizon, when an online algorithm is considered, future
user electricity consumption is estimated by forecasting the
future electricity prices and running Monte Carlo simulations.
The optimal decision at any time is characterized by con-
sidering both the current inputs and the forecasts through a
rolling online stochastic optimization process. Load shifting,
i.e., the scheduling of the user’s flexible electricity demand
in accordance with privacy as well as cost concerns, can also
be considered. Load shifting is analyzed in [38] and in [39],
where privacy, cost of energy, and battery wear and tear are
jointly optimized, and an online algorithm is formulated. The
objective is to minimize the sum of current and expected
electricity and charging/discharging costs together with the
weighted power profile differences measured through the sim-
ilarity parameters for an entire day. The effectiveness of three
similarity measures are examined in [39] separately, as well as
jointly, where only four typical appliances, an oven, a clothes
dryer, a dishwasher and an electric vehicle, are considered for
the sake of simplicity.
Heuristic Algorithms
While the grid load can be flattened by minimizing the
variation of the grid load around a constant consumption
target, several works in the literature propose heuristic battery
charging and discharging algorithms, which keep the grid
load variations limited. An intuitive approach is to try to
keep the grid load equal to its most recent value by dis-
charging (charging) the RB when the current user load is
larger (smaller) than the previous one. This approach, called
the best-effort (BE) algorithm in [40], tends to eliminate
the higher frequency components of the user load, while
still revealing the lower frequency components. In [40], the
similarity between the two probability distributions of the user
and grid load is quantified via the empirical relative entropy
(i.e., Kullback-Leibler divergence) [41]. In the same work,
the authors also consider cluster classification, whereby data
is clustered according to power levels, and cross-correlation
and regression procedures, according to which the grid load
is shifted in time at the point of maximum cross-correlation
with the user load, and regression methods are then used to
compare the two aligned signals.
A slightly more sophisticated approach is considered in
[42], called the non-intrusive load levelling (NILL) algorithm,
in which more than one grid load target value, namely a
steady state target and low and high recovery state targets are
allowed, and the EMU tries to maintain the grid load at one
of these values across time. If the steady state load cannot be
maintained, the EMU switches to a high (low) recovery state
in case of persistent light (heavy) user demand. When one
of the recovery states is reached, the target load is adapted
accordingly to permit the battery to charge or discharge,
similarly to the empirical strategies outlined in [43]. The value
of the steady state target load can be updated whenever a
recovery state is reached, in order to reduce the occurrences
of recovery states, which is achieved by using an exponential
weighted moving average of the demand. To assess their
proposed approach, the authors in [42] count the number of
features, i.e., the number of times a device is recognized as
being on or off, from the grid load, as compared to the user
load, and they further consider the empirical entropy.
As also pointed out in [44], these heuristic algorithms suffer
from precise load change recovery attacks that can identify
peaks of user demand. We note that the NILL algorithm is
essentially quantizing the input load to three values with the
help of the RB. This idea is generalized in [44] by considering
an arbitrary number of quantization levels. Since quantization
is a “many-to-few mapping”, converting the grid load to a step
function is inherently a non-linear and irreversible process,
which can be used to provide privacy by maximizing the
quantization error under battery limitations. More specifically,
the grid load is forced to be a multiple of a quantity β, i.e.,
yt = htβ, where ht is an integer value, and β is the largest
value that satisfies battery’s maximum capacity and power
constraints. At any time slot, given the user load, the grid
load is chosen between the two adjacent levels to the user load,
namely
⌈
xt
β
⌉
and
⌊
xt
β
⌋
, where
⌈
·
⌉
and
⌊
·
⌋
denote the ceiling
and floor functions, respectively. Three stepping algorithms
are proposed in [44], which have different quantization levels:
1) the lazy stepping algorithm, which tries to maintain the
external load constant for as long as possible; 2) the lazy
charging algorithm, which keeps charging (discharging) the
battery until it is full (empty); and 3) the random charg-
ing algorithm that chooses its actions at random. While the
simulation results show that these algorithms outperform the
BE and NILL algorithms, with the lazy stepping algorithm
typically performing the best, it is hard to make general
claims due to the heuristic nature of these algorithms. In
fact, these approaches do not provide theoretical guarantees
on the level of privacy achieved; thus, they are not able to
make any general claim about the strength of the proposed
privacy-preserving approaches and their absolute performance.
This is an important limitation as consumers would like to
know the level of privacy they can achieve, even if it is in
statistical terms. Also, because such heuristics are often based
on deterministic schemes, they are prone to be easily reverse-
engineered.
THEORETICAL GUARANTEES ON SM PRIVACY
One of the challenges in SM privacy is to provide theo-
retical assurances and fundamental limits on the information
leaked by an SM system, independently of any assumption
on the capability of an attacker, or of the particular NILM
algorithm employed. This is essential in privacy research as
privacy-preserving techniques may perform extremely well
against some NILM algorithms and very poorly against others.
Moreover, the privacy assurances should not be based on the
complexity limitations of a potential attacker, as techniques
that are currently thought not to be feasible, may become avail-
able to attackers in the future, if computational capabilities
improve, or if new methods are developed. Last but not least,
establishing a coherent mathematical framework would allow
us to compare various SM scenarios and the use of different
physical resources, e.g., RBs of various capacities, RESs
of various nature, etc., in a rigorous manner. Accordingly,
signal processing and information-theoretic tools have been
employed in the literature to provide theoretical privacy assur-
ances. We will overview various different statistical measures
for privacy, in particular, the conditional entropy [43], Fisher
information (FI) [45], or type II error probability in detecting
user activity [46].
In this statistical framework, it is commonly assumed that
the statistics of the user load and the RES are stationary
over the period of interest, and are known to the EMU. This
assumption is reasonable especially if the period of stationarity
is sufficiently long for the EMU to observe and learn these
statistics [47]–[49]. On the other hand, an online learning
theoretic framework can also be considered to account for
the convergence time of the learning algorithm. Alternatively,
most of the works in the literature that carry out a theo-
retical analysis also propose suboptimal policies that can be
applied on real power traces, thus allowing the reader to gain
intuition about the practical application and performance of
these theoretically-motivated techniques. We take a worst-case
approach, and assume that the statistics governing the involved
random processes are known also by the attacker. Note that
this can only empower the attacker, and strengthen the stated
privacy guarantees.
The Significance of Single-Letter Expressions
It is expected that a meaningful privacy measure should
consider the leakage of a user’s information over a certain time
period of reasonable length, because of the memory effects
introduced by the RB and the RES. The energy consumption
over a short period of time can be easily covered by satisfying
all the demand from the RB or the RES over this period, but
this may come at the expense of revealing the energy consump-
tion fully at future time periods. Therefore, the information
theoretic analysis typically considers an average information
rate measured over a given finite time period, and often studies
its infinite-horizon asymptotics as well. However, increasing
the time horizon also increases the problem complexity, and
one of the challenges of the information-theoretic analysis is
to obtain a so-called “single-letter” expression for the optimal
solution, which would reduce the problem complexity signif-
icantly, particularly when the involved random variables are
defined over finite alphabets. Unfortunately, to date, closed-
form or single-letter expressions for the information leaked
in an SM system have been characterized only for specific
settings under various simplifications, e.g., considering an i.i.d.
or Markov user load or RES generation.
MI as a Privacy Measure
The entropy of a random variable X , H(X), is a measure
of the uncertainty of its realization. The MI between ran-
dom variables X and Y , I(X ;Y ), measures the amount of
information shared between the two random variables [41].
MI can also be considered as a measure of dependence
between the random variables X and Y , and it is equal to
zero if and only if they are independent. Rewriting the MI
as I(X ;Y ) = H(X) − H(X |Y ), where H(X |Y ) is the
conditional entropy, we can also interpret MI as the average
reduction in the uncertainty of X from the knowledge of Y .
Therefore, we can measure the privacy leakage about the input
load sequence Xn through the SM readings Y n by the MI
between the two sequences, I(Xn;Y n). This will measure the
reduction in the uncertainty of the UP about the real energy
consumption of the appliances, Xn, after receiving the SM
measurements, Y n. For an SM system with only an RB (no
RES) and a given EMP f in (2), running over n time slots,
the average information leakage rate Inf (Bmax, Pˆd) is defined
as
Inf (Bmax, Pˆd) ,
1
n
I(Xn;Y n) =
1
n
[
H(Xn)−H(Xn|Y n)
]
,
(7)
where 0 ≤ Xt − Yt ≤ Pˆd. The parameters Bmax and Pˆd
emphasize the dependence of the EMP, and therefore, of the
achievable information leakage rate, on the battery capacity
and the discharging peak power constraint. The optimal EMP
and the corresponding minimum information leakage rate is
obtained by minimizing (7) over all feasible policies f ∈ F
to obtain In(Bmax, Pˆd).
Privacy with an RES: Alternatively, one can also consider
the SM system of Fig. 4 with an RES, but no RB. Assume that
the renewable energy that can be used over the operation pe-
riod is constrained by an average and a peak power constraint.
We do not allow selling the generated renewable energy to
the UP, as our goal is to understand the impact of the RES
on providing privacy to the user. The minimum information
leakage rate achieved under these assumptions and for an i.i.d.
user load can be characterized by the so-called privacy-power
function I(P¯ , Pˆd), and can be formulated in the following
single-letter form:
I(P¯ , Pˆ ) = inf
pY |X∈P
I (X ;Y ) , (8)
where P , {pY |X : y ∈ Y,E[(X − Y )] ≤ P¯ , 0 ≤
X − Y ≤ Pˆ}. This formulation is presented in [50] for a
discrete user load alphabet, i.e.,X can only assume values that
are multiples of a fixed quantum, and in [51], for a continuous
user load alphabet, i.e., X can assume any real value within
the limits specified by the peak power constraints of the
appliances. The optimal EMP that minimizes (8) is stochastic
and memoryless, that is, the optimal grid load at each time slot
is generated randomly via the optimal conditional probability
that minimizes (8) by only considering the current user load.
Another interesting observation is that Eq. (8) is in a similar
form to the well-known rate-distortion function in information
theory, which characterizes the minimum compression rate R
of data, in bits per sample, that is required for the receiver
to reconstruct the source sequence within a specified average
distortion level D [41]. Formally, the rate-distortion function
R(D) for an i.i.d. source X ∈ X with distribution pX , recon-
struction alphabet Xˆ , and distortion function d(xˆ, x), where
the distortion between sequences Xn and Xˆn is given by
1
n
∑n
i=1 d(xi, xˆi), characterizes the minimum rate with which
an average distortion of D is achievable. The compression rate
specifies the size of the codebook 2nR, required to compress
the source sequence of length n, Xn. Shannon showed that
the rate-distortion function can be obtained in the following
single-letter form:
R(D) = min
p
Xˆ|X :
∑
(x,xˆ) pXpXˆ|Xd(x,xˆ)≤D
I(Xˆ;X). (9)
The analogy between (8) and (9) becomes clear considering
the following distortion measure
d(x, y) =
{
x− y, if 0 ≤ x− y ≤ Pˆ ,
∞, otherwise,
(10)
and such analogy enables using tools from rate-distortion
theory to evaluate the privacy-power function for an SM
system. However, it is important to highlight that despite the
functional similarity, there are major conceptual differences
between the two problems, namely: i) in the SM privacy
problem Y n is the direct output of the encoder rather than
the reconstruction at the decoder side; ii) unlike the lossy
source encoder, the EMU does not operate over blocks of
user load realizations; instead, it operates symbol by symbol,
acting instantaneously after receiving the appliance load at
each time slot. For discrete user load alphabets, the grid load
alphabet can be constrained to the user load alphabet without
loss of optimality [52], and since MI is a convex function
of the conditional probability pY |X ∈ P , the privacy-power
function can be written as a convex optimization problem
with linear constraints. Algorithms such as the Blahut Arimoto
(BA) algorithm can be used to numerically compute the
optimal conditional distribution [41]. For continuous user load
Fig. 9. A single EMU and RES are shared among N users, each equipped
with an SM. The EMU decides how much energy each user can retrieve from
the RES and from the grid.
distributions, the Shannon lower bound is derived in [52],
which is a computable lower bound to the rate-distortion
function widely used in the literature, and is shown to be tight
for exponential user load distributions.
These results can be generalized to a multi-user scenario
in which N users, each equipped with a single SM, share
the same RES [52]. This scenario is represented in Fig. 9,
where the objective is to minimize the total privacy loss
of N consumers (or, devices) considered jointly, rather than
minimizing the privacy loss for each of them separately. This
requires the EMU to allocate the shared RES among all the
users in the most effective manner. The average information
leakage rate can still be written as in (7), by replacing Xt and
Yt with Xt = [X1,t, . . . , XN,t] and Yt = [Y1,t, . . . , YN,t],
where the boldface characters denote the vectors representing
the N power measurements. The privacy-power function has
the same expression in (8), and, for the case of independent,
but not necessarily identically distributed user loads, the opti-
mization problem (ignoring the peak power constraint) can be
cast as
I(P¯ ) = inf∑
N
i=1 Pi≤P¯
N∑
i=1
IXi(Pi), (11)
where IXi(·) denotes the privacy-power function for the i-th
user having user load distribution pXi(xi). For continuous and
exponential user loads, the optimal allocation of the energy
generated by an RES can be obtained by the reverse water-
filling algorithm, according to which energy from the RES is
only used to satisfy the users with a low average load, while
users with higher average load need to request energy from
the grid as well.
Privacy with an RB: We can also consider the presence
of only an RB in the system, which is thus charged only via
the grid (no RES is available to the EMU). Including an RB
complicates the problem significantly, and the battery SoC,
Bt, plays an important role when designing a feasible EMP.
This problem can be solved by putting it in the form of
an MDP and by finding a suitable additive formulation for
the privacy cost function [53]. The optimization problem is
formulated as
L∗ , min
f
1
n
I(B1, X
n;Y n), (12)
where f can be any feasible policy, as specified in (2) (without
including the renewable energy process). Eq. (12) has been
cast in an additive formulation in [53] by noting that there
is no loss of optimality in restricting the focus to charging
strategies f ′ that decide on the grid load only based on the
current values of the user load Xt and battery SoC Bt, and on
the past values of the grid load Y t−1, i.e., the general strategy
f in (2) is specified as f ′t : X × B × Y
t−1 → Y, ∀t, because
of the following inequality:
1
n
I(Xn, B1;Y
n) ≥
1
n
n∑
t=1
I(Xt, Bt;Yt|Y
t−1). (13)
The conditional distributions in (13) grow exponentially
with time because of the term Y t−1, so that the problem
becomes computationally infeasible very quickly. To overcome
this problem, the knowledge of Y t−1 is summarized into
a belief state, defined as p(Xt, Bt|Y
t−1), which can be
computed recursively and interpreted as the belief that the UP
has about (Xt, Bt) at time t, given its past observations, Y
t−1.
This way, the optimal Bellman equations can be formulated,
and the optimal policy can be identified numerically (with a
discretization of the belief state).
For an i.i.d. user load, the single-letter characterization of
the minimum information leakage rate is given by [53] as
J∗ , min
θ∈PB
I(B −X ;X), (14)
where θ is the probability distribution over B given the past
output and actions, i.e., θt , p(bt|y
t−1, at−1), and the action
at is defined as the transition probability from the current
belief, user load and battery SoC to the current grid load. This
result is obtained by considering a belief on Wt , Bt −Xt,
rather than (Bt, Xt), and by further restricting to policies of
the type f ′′t : W × Y
t−1 → Y, ∀t. Since (14) is convex
in θ, the optimal θ∗ may be obtained by using the BA
algorithm. The optimal grid load turns out to be i.i.d. and
indistinguishable from the demand, while the optimal policy
is memoryless and the distribution of Yt depends only on Wt.
Such a characterization is provided in [54] for a binary i.i.d.
user load, while the authors extend it to an i.i.d. user load of
generic alphabet size in [53], [55], [56].
Another approach is to model the SoC of the RB as a
trapdoor channel [57]. In a trapdoor channel, a certain number
of red or blue balls are within the channel, and a new ball of
either color is inserted to it as the channel input at each time
step. After the new ball is inserted, one of the balls present
in the channel is randomly selected and removed from the
channel. In a SM setting, the finite-capacity RB can be viewed
as a trapdoor channel, whereby inserting or extracting a ball
from the channel represents charging or discharging the RB,
respectively. An upper bound on the information leakage rate
is characterized in [58] through this model, by minimizing
the information leakage rate over the set of stable output
balls, i.e., the set of feasible output sequences Y n that can be
extracted from the channel given a certain initial state and an
input sequence Xn, and by taking inspiration from codebook
construction strategies in [59]. The information leakage rate
is characterized in [58] as
1
n
I(Xn;Y n) =
1
⌈(Bmax + 1)/Xmax⌉
, (15)
whereXmax is the largest valueX can assume. It is also shown
in [58] that the average user energy consumption determines
the level of achievable privacy.
Apart from only maximizing privacy, it is of interest to
also minimize the cost. Differently from privacy, cost of
energy has an immediate additive formulation and can be
easily incorporated into the MDP formulation. Considering the
random price vector Ct = (C1, . . . , Ct), where Ct denotes the
unit cost of energy at time slot t, privacy can be defined in
the long time horizon as
P , lim
t→∞
H(Xt|Y t, Ct)
t
. (16)
This formulation is presented in [43], where the correspond-
ing MDP is formulated, and two suboptimal algorithms are
proposed. The first is a greedy algorithm, which maximizes at
any time the current instantaneous reward, while the second
is a battery centering approach that is aimed at keeping the
battery at a medium level of charge so that the EMU is less
constrained by the battery or the demand in determining the
grid load. In the latter approach, if the grid load depends
not on the current user load or the battery level, but only
on the current electricity price, the system is said to be in
a hidden state, while it is said to be in a revealing state,
otherwise. The latter strategy is analyzed for an i.i.d. user load
by considering the system as a recurrent Markov chain and by
adopting random walk theory.
Privacy with both an RES and an RB: When both
an RES and an RB are present, the information theoretic
privacy analysis becomes more challenging. As an initial
step, we can consider infinite and zero battery capacities,
which represent, respectively, lower and upper bounds on
the privacy leakage achievable for a practical SM system
with a finite-capacity battery [60], [61]. When Bmax = ∞,
the problem can be shown to be equivalent to the average
and peak power-constrained scenario, and, interestingly, the
privacy performance does not deteriorate even if the UP knows
the exact amount of renewable energy generated. This shows
that, keeping the renewable energy generation process private
is more critical when the RB has a limited capacity. Two
different energy management policies are shown to achieve the
lower bound in [61]. In the best-effort policy, at any time slot,
the optimal EMP derived from (11) is employed independently
of the RB SoC if there is sufficient energy in the RB, while
all the energy request is satisfied from the grid otherwise. The
latter one leads to full leakage of user consumption, but it can
be shown that these events are rare enough that the information
Fig. 10. Minimum information leakage rate with respect to the renewable
energy generation rate pe with X = E = Y = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The leakage
for Bmax = ∞ has been found by setting Pˆ = 4 [61].
leakage rate does not increase. In the alternative store-and-hide
policy, an initial storage phase is employed, during which all
the energy requests of the user are satisfied from the grid while
all the generated renewable energy is stored in the battery.
In the following hiding phase, the EMU deploys the optimal
policy designed under average and peak power constraints.
On the other extreme, when Bmax = 0, the renewable
energy that can be used at any time slot is limited by the
amount of energy generated within that time slot. As expected,
assuming the knowledge of the renewable energy process at
the UP significantly degrades the privacy performance for this
scenario. Fig. 10 compares the minimum information leakage
rate with respect to the renewable energy generation rate pe
for |X | = |E| = |Y| = 5 when Bmax = {0, 1, 2,∞}. In this
figure, the curves for a finite battery capacity of Bmax = 1
and Bmax = 2 are obtained numerically by considering a
suboptimal EMP [61].
The presence of a finite-capacity battery increases the
problem complexity dramatically due to the memory effects
induced by the finite battery, and single-letter expressions are
still lacking for this scenario. A possible approach to find a
theoretical solution to this problem is by extending the MDP
formulation, as investigated in [62].
Detection Error Probability as a Privacy Measure
So far we have considered approaches that try to hide the
complete user energy demand from the UP. However, rather
than hiding the entire energy consumption profile, in some
cases it may be more meaningful to keep private specific user
activities, such as “is there anybody at home?”, “has the alarm
been activated?” or “are you eating microwaved food?”. In
order to keep the answer to such questions private, the goal of
the EMU is to maximize the attacker’s probability of making
errors when attempting to answer them.
Let the consumer’s behavior that needs to be kept private
belong to a set of M possible activities. Thus, we can treat
the attacker’s decision and the user’s action as an M -ary
hypothesis, i.e., H ∈ H = {h0, h1, . . . hM−1}. When M = 2,
the hypothesis test is said to be binary and, by convention,
the hypothesis h0, called the null hypothesis, represents the
absence of some factor or condition, while the hypothesis
h1, called the alternative hypothesis, is the complementary
condition. For example, answering the question “is somebody
at home?” corresponds to a binary hypothesis test, where h0
is the hypothesis “somebody is not at home” and h1 is the
hypothesis “somebody is at home”. It is reasonable to assume
that the input load will have different statistics under these two
hypotheses; accordingly, we assume that under hypothesis h0
(h1), the energy demand at time slot t is i.i.d. with pX|h0
(pX|h1). Based on the SM readings, the attacker aims at
determining the best decision rule Hˆ(·), i.e., the optimal map
between the SM readings and the underlying hypothesis. In
other words, the space of all possible SM readings, Yn, is
partitioned into the two disjoint decision regions A0 and A1,
defined as follows:
A0 , {y
n|Hˆ(yn) = h0}, (17)
A1 , {y
n|Hˆ(yn) = h1}, (18)
which correspond to the subsets of the SM readings for which
the UP decides for one of the two hypotheses. The attacker’s
binary hypothesis test can incur two types of errors:
• Type I error probability: make a decision h1 when h0 is
the true hypothesis (false positive or false alarm), i.e.,
pI = pY n|h1(A0);
• Type II error probability: make a decision h0 when h1
is the true hypothesis (false negative or miss), i.e., pII =
pY n|h0(A1).
The Neyman-Pearson test minimizes the type II error proba-
bility for a fixed maximum type I error probability and makes
decisions by thresholding the likelihood ratio
pY n|h0 (y
n|h0)
pY n|h1 (y
n|h1)
.
Consider the worst case of an all-powerful attacker, which
has the perfect knowledge of the EMP employed, in the
asymptotic regime n → ∞, and denote by pminII the minimal
type II probability of error subject to a constraint on the type
I probability of error. Assuming that a memoryless EMP is
employed by the EMU, that is, the grid load at any time
slot t depends only on the input load at the same time slot,
then the attacker runs a Neyman-Pearson detection test on the
grid load. We note that the memoryless EMP assumption is
not without loss of optimality. However, it is justified on the
grounds that, characterizing the more general optimal policy
with memory seems to be significantly more challenging, and
unlikely to lend itself to a single-letter expression. Chernoff-
Stein Lemma [41] links the minimal type II error probability
pminII to the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergenceD(·||·) between
the grid load distributions conditioned on the two hypotheses
in the limit of the number of observations going to infinity:
lim
n→∞
−
log pminII
n
= D(pY |h0 ||pY |h1), (19)
while the KL divergence between two probability distribution
functions on X , pX and qX , is defined as [41]
D(pX ||qX) ,
∑
x∈X
pX(x) log
pX(x)
qX(x)
. (20)
Not surprisingly, to maximize the privacy the goal of the
EMU is to find the optimal grid load distributions, which,
given the user load X and the true hypothesis H , minimizes
the KL divergence in (19), or equivalently, minimizes the
asymptotic exponential decay rate of pminII . However, the EMU
is constrained by the available resources in making the two
input load distributions produce similar grid load distributions.
In particular, we impose a constraint on the average RES it can
use. Thus, the objective is to solve the following minimization
problem:
min
pY |H∈PY |H
D(pY |h0 ||pY |h1), (21)
where PY |H is the set of feasible energy management policies,
i.e., those that satisfy the average RES generation rate P¯ , so
that 1
n
E[
∑n
i=1Xi − Yi|hj ] ≤ P¯ , j = 0, 1. This setting is
studied in [63], where the asymptotic single-letter expressions
of two privacy-preserving EMPs in the worst case scenario are
considered, i.e., when the probability of type I error is close
to 1. The first policy is a memoryless hypothesis-aware policy
that decides on Yt based only on the current Xt and H , while
the second policy is unaware of the correct hypothesis H but
takes into account all the previous realizations of X and Y .
It is noteworthy that even if the hypothesis-unaware policy
with memory does not have access to the current hypothesis,
it performs at least as well as the memoryless hypothesis-
aware policy. This is because the hypothesis-unaware policy
is able to learn the hypothesis with negligible error probability
after observing the energy demand process for a sufficiently
long period. Additionally, the energy supply alphabet can be
constrained to the energy demand alphabet without loss of
optimality, which greatly simplifies the numerical solution to
the problem.
FI as a Privacy Measure
FI is another statistical measure that can be employed
as a measure of SM privacy [45]. Let some sample data
x be drawn according to a distribution depending on an
underlying parameter θ. Then, FI is a measure of the amount
of information that x contains about θ. In the SM setting, Y n
is the sample data available to the attacker, while Xn is the
parameter underlying the sample data that is to be estimated
by the UP. Let Xˆn denote the estimate of the UP. The FI
can be generalized to the multivariate case by the FI matrix,
defined as
FI(xn) =∫
yn∈Yn
p(yn|xn)
[
∂ log(p(yn|xn))
∂xn
][
∂ log(p(yn|xn))
∂xn
]T
dyn.
(22)
Fig. 11. An example of RB evolution modelled as an FSM, with B =
{0, 1, . . . Bmax} and X = E = Y = {0, 1}. The 4-tuple (x, e, v, y)
represent for every time t the values of the user load, the renewable energy
produced, the energy taken out of the battery by the EMU, and the grid load,
respectively.
Assuming an unbiased estimator at the attacker, i.e., the
difference between the estimator’s expected value and the
true average value of the parameter being estimated is zero,
the variance of the estimation error can be bounded via the
Crame´r-Rao bound as follows:
E[||xn − xˆn(yn)||22] ≥ Tr(FI(x
n)−1), (23)
where ||xn − xˆn(yn)||22 denotes the squared Euclidean norm,
and Tr(A) denotes the trace of matrix A. To maximize the
privacy it is then necessary to maximize the trace of the inverse
of the FI matrix. In [45], two SM settings with RB are studied,
specifically when the battery charging policy is independent
of the user load, and when it is dependent non-causally on
the entire user load sequence. For both cases single-letter
expressions are obtained for the maximum privacy. Moreover,
the case of biased estimators, wear and tear of the batteries,
and peak power charging and discharging constraints are also
briefly analyzed in [45].
Empirical MI as a Privacy Measure
Approaches aimed at determining theoretical privacy limits
provide important insights and intuitions for the optimal en-
ergy management policy in order to limit the privacy leakage.
However, they are often difficult to optimize or even evaluate
numerically, and the relatively simplified formulation obtained
in various special cases rely on restrictive assumptions, e.g.,
i.i.d. user load, infinite RB capacity, etc. An alternative is
to follow a suboptimal or heuristic EMP. Although such a
policy does not provide theoretical privacy guarantees, one
can evaluate the corresponding privacy leakage numerically
using empirical MI.
One way to compute the empirical MI is by simulating a
discrete time system for a “large enough” time interval and
sampling the resulting Xn and Y n sequences [64]. The MI
between two sequences xn and yn can be approximated as
I(X ;Y ) ≈ −
1
n
log p(yn)−
1
n
log p(xn) +
1
n
log p(xn, yn),
(24)
where p(yn), p(xn) and p(xn, yn) are calculated recursively
through a sum-product computation. When using this method,
the RB is modeled as a finite state machine (FSM), and
the battery SoC evolves in time through a Markov chain
with transition probabilities depending on the specific policy
implemented. An example FSM is illustrated in Fig. 11, where
all the processes are considered to be binary and Bernoulli
distributed, and the parameters are qx = Pr{X = 1},
pe = Pr{E = 1} and pv, the latter being the probability
of using energy from the battery provided there is available
energy. The support space for the parameters is discretized,
and the optimal combination of parameters is found, which
minimizes the empirical MI. This approach is followed in [65],
where only a binary RB is present and for an i.i.d. Bernoulli
distributed user demand, and in [66] where an RES is also
considered. The latter work also analyzes the wasted energy
and characterize the privacy-vs-energy efficiency trade-off for
the binary scenario and equiprobable user load and renewable
energy generation processes. For larger battery capacities
and for an equiprobable user load, they note that there is
a symmetry and complementarity in the optimal transition
probabilities in the FSM model, which simplifies the numerical
analysis. This model is also employed in [60] and [61] by
considering an RES and designing a suboptimal policy, which,
at each time instant, decides among using all of the available
energy, half of it, or no energy at all, according to a probability
chosen to minimize the overall information leakage.
Another technique for approximating MI is to assume X
and Y to be i.i.d. over a time interval, and approximate the MI
via the relative frequency of events (Xt, Yt) during the same
time window. In [67] this approach is enriched by additive
smoothing, i.e., avoiding zero probability estimates by adding
a positive scalar, and it is employed together with a model-
distribution predictive controller, such that, at each time slot t,
the EMU decides its actions for a prediction horizon of length
T , i.e., up to time t+T . Privacy and cost are jointly optimized
by considering non-causal knowledge of the renewable energy
generation process, user load and energy prices, while EMU’s
actions, i.e., the energy that is requested from the grid and
the battery, are forecast over the prediction horizon. The user
and grid load processes are assumed to be i.i.d. within a time
window N ≫ T , which also includes the prediction horizon
T , and finite alphabets X and Y are considered. As N ≫ T ,
first-order Taylor approximation of the logarithm function is
used, and the corresponding mixed integer quadratic program
is formulated, which is of manageable size and can be solved
recursively whenever new SM readings are available. Results
show that considering a relatively small prediction horizon T
prevents the EMU from fully utilizing the RB capacity, as
the user load that is considered by the algorithm is generally
smaller then the RB capacity. Allowing a longer prediction
interval dramatically improves the performance in terms of
both privacy and cost, at the expense of a much higher com-
putational complexity. The work also shows that by increasing
the alphabet sizes of X and Y better privacy performance can
be achieved.
Empirical MI normalized by the empirical entropy of the
user load is considered in [68], where an RB is used to
minimize the energy cost subject to privacy constraints. Here
two cost tariffs are considered, a low-price and a high-
price, and a dynamic programming approach is developed to
maximize the energy stored in the battery at the end of the
low-price period, and minimize it at the end of the high-price
period. At every time slot, the optimal probability distribution
of the grid load is computed, which is forced to be independent
of the user load distribution.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
Privacy and “the right to be let alone” are an individual’s
inalienable fundamental rights, which are safeguarded in many
national constitutions worldwide. In Europe, the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [69], which will be enforced
from 25 May 2018, will set even more stringent requirements
for every technology or device that collects and processes
customer data, including SMs. For these reasons, addressing
the SM privacy problem is crucial for the adoption of the SG
concept. In fact, considering the growing privacy concerns
of the consumers for SMs as well as many other emerging
technologies [70], a critical growth in SM adoption and other
SG technologies will take place only when consumers are
given full control of their privacy, and they feel they have
clear and honest information on how their data is being used.
Only then, consumer resistance can be overcome and their
trust will be assured, thus paving the way to a more fertile
and fair ground for new products and increased innovation in
this domain.
UPs and their partners, including governments, may be too
keen on collecting users’ data indiscriminately, and less incen-
tivized to develop privacy-enhancing technologies. Therefore,
legislators, public commissions, consumer advocacy groups
and researchers have an important role in tackling the SM
privacy problem, and preventing the SM data from being
gathered indiscriminately and sold to third parties without
explicit user consent, or even passed to government intelli-
gence agencies for mass surveillance scopes. GDPR is a good
example of such initiatives. However, given that such a legal
framework is still lacking and not yet fully developed globally,
it becomes imperative to push forward the concept of privacy-
by-design, according to which privacy should be “designed-in”
to new products and services, rather than considered only after
user complaints and regulatory impositions. This is because a
wider range of options are available during the design stage
as compared to modifying the product following a privacy
incident or a user complaint. Achieving privacy-by-design is
the ultimate goal of the techniques analyzed in this paper.
In this article we have focused exclusively on techniques
that adopt physical resources, such as RESs and RBs, to
provide privacy to users. Main motivation and benefits of these
techniques is that they do not undermine the benefits of the
SG concept. Each of the outlined techniques has its unique
advantages and disadvantages, and focuses on a particular
aspect of privacy. However, despite the considerable efforts
put into developing SM privacy-preserving techniques, the
full extent of the privacy problem in SMs is far from being
completely understood, and a unified and coherent vision for
SM privacy (just like in many other domains) is still missing.
In the context of SM privacy, UDS-based methods ma-
nipulate a physical quantity, energy, to ensure privacy for
users. This entails that physical constraints, such as those
related to an RB or an RES, play a crucial role in finding
the optimal privacy-preserving strategy. We expect that the
techniques developed for enhancing SM privacy can prove
useful in other privacy-sensitive settings, in which physical
quantities are involved, such as gas and water meters, or
location privacy.
Research Challenges
Various challenges must be addressed before privacy-by-
design can become a reality in SM systems. Firstly, a generic
privacy measure, or a combination of different measures, must
be determined and adopted in order to formally quantify the
loss of privacy, in the same way a user’s electricity bill is
computed. Such a measure should be device-independent, and
enable the comparison of various privacy-preserving strategies.
It is also necessary to understand the implications of the
various privacy measures on the grid load. From this point
of view, theoretical measures may be preferable due to their
abstract and fundamental nature, i.e., they are independent of
any assumptions on the attacker’s algorithms. However, their
relevance in real-world scenarios must be assessed further, and,
if necessary, valid suboptimal privacy measures or algorithms
should be put forward and standardized as a proxy for more
rigorous privacy assurances.
Another important goal is to give consumers as much
flexibility as possible in setting their desired level of privacy,
trading off privacy with the cost of electricity, or other services.
It is also essential to allow consumers the possibility of setting
different privacy requirements for different devices, as users
may value the information about the usage of a certain device
more sensitive compared to others. This may happen because
certain devices are naturally more correlated to the user’s
activities or presence at home, such as the use of a kettle,
a microwave or an oven, or because a user may decide to hide
the usage of a certain appliance for personal reasons.
In the near future, a wider use of electric vehicles will also
bring additional complications to the SM privacy problem, as
mobility patterns may be inferred by analyzing the charging
and discharging events. This problem can be tackled by load
shifting, which is expected to play an important role in jointly
optimizing electricity cost and privacy. Load shifting, as well
as other privacy-preserving techniques introduced here, will be
more accurate and relevant thanks to the development of reli-
able prediction techniques for future electricity consumption,
e.g., by using machine learning techniques. The proliferation
of various energy-hungry “smart devices” will complicate the
problem further and overburden RBs even more. Finally, the
use of shared physical resources should also be investigated in
more depth, as cities are becoming more and more dense and
users may want to team up to install storage devices or energy
generators that are still rather costly. In cities, solar panels or
mini wind turbines may be installed on the roof of blocks
of flats and RBs may be put in communal areas, and these
resources can be used jointly by all the users in a building.
Such resource sharing models make the privacy problem even
more complicated and challenging, and might call for a game
theoretic formulation of the problem.
Overall, we hope that presenting this overview of the SM
privacy problem and current solutions will further encourage
research and development in this area, so that remaining open
issues will be solved and the SMs’ full potential will be
unleashed.
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